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1. Introduction 
Regional trading agreements have become very popular in recent times.  Some 
well known trading blocs are NAFTA, EU, SAARC, and MERCOSUR.  However, there 
are several others which are less prominent.  While these agreements strive to eliminate 
trade barriers within blocs, they typically do not achieve complete free trade (see Baldwin 
and Venables, 1995).  Each member tries to pursue their own interests such as the amount 
of tariff reduction that they are willing to concede in return for better access to their 
partners’ markets.  Also, the issues on the negotiation table are not limited to trade policy 
alone, but cover a variety of related problems.  Illegal immigration is one of the important 
related issues, especially for PTAs that involve bordering nations.   
Illegal immigration has been a serious problem in NAFTA, especially along the 
US-Mexico border.  Recent estimates (see Orrenius 2001) suggest that there are about 3 
million undocumented Mexican immigrants in the US in 1997.  About 202,000 Mexicans 
immigrated per year between 1987 and 1996.  Tariffs change domestic prices, and cause 
adjustment between different sectors and indirectly affect the labor market.  The resulting 
change in labor market conditions influence immigration flows.  On the other hand, 
immigration flows due to changes in the source nation or due to policy, directly affect the 
labor market.  Clearly, these two issues, tariff and immigration, are interrelated.  Thus 
trade negotiations have to and do consider these issues simultaneously.
1 
The literature on regional trade agreements has explored a variety of issues (see 
for example, Ethier and Horn, 1984, Baldwin and Venables, 1995, Bhagwati, Krishna, 
                                                 
1 NAFTA negotiations/documents discuss both tariff liberalization and ways to control illegal labor flows.  
Former Attorney General Reno called the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico “..our best hope for reducing 
illegal immigration over the long haul.”  http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/101293-fact-sheet-on-
nafta-notes.htm   2
and Panagariya, 1999).  Ethier and Horn (1984) have shown that (i) marginal reduction of 
tariff improves joint welfare of a trade bloc starting from non-discriminatory tariff, and 
(ii) marginal increase in internal tariff improves joint welfare of trade bloc starting from 
free intra-trade bloc in a tariff-ridden world.  These imply the presence of a positive 
internal tariff.  Panagariya (1999) derives the second best tariff within the context of the 
Meade Model.  In addition to the analysis of marginal changes in tariffs, the literature has 
explored welfare implications of complete tariff elimination.  Panagariya and Krishna 
(2002) consider circumstances under which an FTA must improve the joint welfare of the 
bloc.   
While the existing literature has deepened our understanding of the nature of 
second best trade taxes and of welfare implications of regional integration, it has not 
adequately addressed the issue of illegal immigration. The agenda of this paper is to 
contribute towards improving our understanding of this issue by complementing the 
existing literature in four ways.  First, we consider how mutual tariff reductions by 
potential bloc members (who are respectively the host and source nations for illegal 
immigration) alter the level of illegal immigration.  Second, we describe the pre-existing 
non-cooperative tariff equilibrium for potential bloc members.  Third, we analyze the 
welfare effect of intra-bloc tariff liberalization starting from the Nash equilibrium.  
Finally, we explore the effect on the host nation (of illegal immigration) of a 
liberalization of its trade with respect to a third nation (outside of the potential bloc).        
     The rest of the paper is organized in the following way.  Section 2 presents the 
model and analysis.  Section 3 concludes. 
   3
2.   The Small Union Case 
We use the small-union Meade model used in Panagariya (1999) and 
Bandyopadhyay (2006).  There are three nations, A, B, and C.  A and B form a 
Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA).  There are three goods; good-1, 2, and 3.  A and B 
both produce goods 1 and 2.  A exports good-1 and imports goods 2 and 3.  B exports 
good-2 and imports goods 1 and 3.  C produces and exports good-3 while it imports 
goods 1 and 2.  We assume A and B impose import tariffs while C pursues free trade.  
Trade liberalization within the bloc takes place as A reduces (or eliminates) import tariff 
on good-2 and B does the same for its import tariff on good-1. These tariffs may be 
denoted as internal tariffs (internal to the bloc) while the tariffs by A and B on good-3 are 
their respective external tariffs.  We abstract from strategic interactions in trade policy 
between the Bloc and the rest of the world, and focus on intra-bloc strategic tariffs, tariff 
liberalization and how it affects the illegal immigration problem.
2    
Nation A is the host country for illegal immigration, while B is the source country.  
Illegal immigrants send earnings back to B, thus A does not retain immigrant’s factor 
rewards (for example, Orrenius (2001) states that:  “The out-migration of Mexican 
citizens brings in $4 billion to $7 billion in remittances each year.”).  Since prices 
(without tariffs) are given exogenously to the small countries within the bloc, we 
                                                 
2 Bandyopadhyay (2006) does address tariffs and illegal immigration.  However, unlike this paper he 
ignores the interdependence in trade policy between the bloc members.  The role of the latter and how it 
affects illegal immigration and national welfare is the central focus of this paper.  We should note that 
interdependence in trade policy is discussed (between a trading bloc and the rest of the world) in Bond, 
Syropoulos, and Winters (2001) and Bond, Riezman, and Syropoulos (2004).  Bond, Syropoulos, and 
Winters (2001) among others shed light on the mutual negotiation process.  They examine how formation 
of customs union with a certain country affects its trade agreements with other countries (multilateral 
agreements).  Their paper derives external tariff response functions of the customs union and the rest of 
world, and thus provides the conditions under which both a customs union and multilateral trade 
agreements are sustainable.  Our paper differs from the Bond et al. papers in two respects.  First, we focus 
on interdependence in tariffs (pre-union) between bloc members.  Secondly, illegal immigration is a major 
issue in this paper.   4
normalize them to be unity.
3  Illegal immigrants earn the wage  I W  and the level of illegal 
immigration itself is I.  Their total earning is I WI , which is repatriated to B.  This amount 
must be subtracted from A’s revenue and added to B’s revenue.  The legal wage rates of  
A and B are denoted as 
A W  and 
B W , respectively.  
A W  is assumed to exceed 
B W  (this 
may be due to technology differences, tariffs or other reasons) and this creates incentives 
for immigrants to illegally cross the border.  A uses internal enforcement and border 
enforcement to control illegal immigration.  The enforcement costs are  i e (internal) and 
b e (border), respectively.  The tariff on good i by nation j is 
j
i t  where i = good 1,2, and 3, 
and j = nations A and B.  The standard expenditure-revenue equations for the three 
nations are described below.  The partial derivatives of expenditure and revenue 
functions are denoted by subscripts.  For instance, 
A E2  is the partial derivative of A’s 
expenditure function with respect to price of good-2. 
b i I
A A A A A A A A A A A A e e I W E t R E t I V t R u t t E − − − + − + + + = + + 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 ) ( ) , 1 , 1 ( ) , 1 , 1 , 1 ( ) 1 (  
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We assume that revenue function is strictly concave in endowment, V , such that  0 <
i
VV R  
for  B A i , = .  Following Ethier (1986) and Bond and Chen (1987), we use the following 
assumptions.  Firms can hire legal workers and pay 
A W  or hire illegal workers and pay 
I W .  However, if firms are detected to be hiring illegal immigrants, they are fined z per 
unit of illegal labor.  There is a probability of detection, which depends on the level of 
internal enforcement.  This is denoted as:  ) ( i e p p = , 0 ' ' , 0 ' < > p p .  The expected fine 
                                                 
3 Later, we relax this assumption.   5
per illegal labor unit hired iszp, and on average this is what firms incur above the illegal 
wage when they hire an illegal immigrant.  Competitive firms equate the cost of hiring 
legal labor to the expected cost of hiring illegal labor. 
) ( ) 4 ( i I
A e zp W W + =  
Potential migrants in B face the risk of being caught by border enforcement.  The 
expected cost may be denoted as ) ( b e β β = ,  0 '> β .  The illegal wage rate, net of this 
cost is:  ) ( b I e W β − .   Assuming risk neutrality, the equilibrium migration condition 
dictates that the certainty wage in B is equated to the net expected wage from migration:   
) ( ) 5 ( b I
B e W W β − =  
 
2.1.   The effect of trade liberalization on the level of illegal immigration 
  This section considers the effect of trade liberalization on illegal immigration.  
Notice that:  (.)
i
V
i R W =  for i = A and B.  Thus, equations (4) and (5) imply: 
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Relation-(6) implicitly defines the level of illegal immigration as: 
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ρ    6
Tariffs change the domestic import prices and hence the wage rates.  These in turn affect 
the incentive for illegal immigration.  We show below that the precise effect of the tariff 
on the immigration flow depends on the characteristics of the labor markets of both 
nations (host and the source).  The parameterρ  captures enforcement policy, and we 
suppress it (for now) to focus on the effect of tariff changes on illegal immigration.  





















Lemma 1.   Suppose under the Preferential Trade Agreement, A and B reduce the internal 
tariff by the same amount while A maintains a given enforcement policy.  Illegal 
immigration increases with trade liberalization if and only if  12
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.   ■ 
Lemma 1 lays down the condition under which trade liberalization (for equal tariff cuts) 
may raise (or reduce) illegal immigration.  Consider the US-Mexico situation.  It is not 
clear whether reciprocal trade liberalization in this context raises or reduces illegal 
immigration.  While Mexico may be described as a relatively more labor abundant   7
nation, it is also true that its agriculture uses unskilled labor and suffers from comparative 
disadvantage compared to the US agriculture.  Trade liberalization may lead to a greater 
inflow of US agricultural products into Mexico and may shrink that sector.  Employment 
reduction in that sector may reduce Mexican wages and raise illegal immigration.  On the 
other hand, if the trade liberalization raises Mexican wages through a greater demand for 
its relatively low skilled manufacturing sector, the effect of illegal immigration is likely 
to be opposite.  Characteristics of the different sectors (in terms of their relative factor 
intensities etc.) and the pattern of trade (between a source and a host nation) will 
determine how trade liberalization will (in practice) affect illegal immigration.  Lemma 1 
provides a useful benchmark for analysis.     
  
2.2.  The Pre-Agreement Nash Tariff Equilibrium 
Here we describe the utility maximizing Nash tariffs of nations A and B on imports 
from each other (given their respective tariffs on good-3 which is imported from C).  A 
chooses its utility maximizing tariff on import of good-2 ( 2
A t ), under the Nash assumption 
that  1
B t is unaffected by this choice.  Also,  3
A t is assumed to be exogenous to this choice.  
Given a positive  3
A t , and its associated trade distortion, the utility maximizing tariff is a 
“second-best” tariff.  As in the existing literature, such a second best tariff partially 
offsets distortions created in the other sector (by  3 0
A t > ).  But there is another factor that 
is central to this paper.  As we have shown in the previous sub-section, tariffs of both the 
A and B (along with A’s enforcement choice) affect the level of illegal immigration.  In 
turn, this affects the choice of second best tariffs for both nations.  This factor also makes 
the utility functions of the two nations interdependent on each other’s tariffs.  Thus the   8
second best tariff for say A has to be chosen under some strategic assumption that it 
makes about B’s choice of tariffs.  We make the traditional simultaneous Nash move 
assumption that A assumes that when it adjusts its tariff, B’s tariff is not be affected.  We 
first derive the Nash reaction functions for each nation’s second best tariffs.  Next we 
explore the conditions that determine the slope of these reaction functions (i.e., whether 
the tariffs are strategic substitutes or complements).  Finally, we describe the Nash 
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assuming normality of all goods.   
The second term in (14) captures the utility effect of a unit rise in the illegal 
immigration level.  The rise in  (.) I has three effects:  (a). it raises the government’s 
expected fine collections; (b). it leads to expansion (or contraction) of domestic 
production of good 2 through the Rybczynski effect and this affects import duty 
collections; and, (c). it reduces the legal wage in A (through an expanded labor supply)   9
leading to a lower wage payment to illegal labor.  The latter is a terms of trade gain for a 
labor importing nation.   
Relations (14) and (15) implicitly define A’s second best Nash tariff reaction 
function: 
) , , , ( ) 16 ( 3 1 2 2 b i
A B A A e e t t t t =  














.  These two first 
order conditions (relating to enforcement) yield: 
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Using (15) in (14) and setting  3 0
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From (19b) it is clear that there is no guarantee that the Nash utility maximizing tariff for 
A is positive.  It is clear that if good-2 is a complement for good-3 (i.e., if  32 0
A E < ), then 
this effect by itself will call for a negative (second best) tariff on good-2 (given  3 0 t > ).  
This is because a reduction in the price of good-2 will raise the demand for good-3 under   10
complemantarity.  The latter reduces the distortion caused by the tariff on good-3.  The 
other effect on the second best tariff is similar to that explained in Bandyopadhyay 
(2006).  If  2 0
A
V R > , then a fall in the price of good-2 reduces the wage in A.  The wage 
reduction in the host nation will reduce illegal immigration through the equilibrium 
migration condition.  Therefore, there is an incentive for A to reduce  2 t to get a reduction 
in illegal immigration.  Therefore, if  2 0
A
V R > , and also if  32 0
A E < , then (19b) suggest that 
it is optimal to impose a negative tariff.  Along the same lines, one can explore the 
conditions that will justify a positive second best tariff.        
Relation-(19a) [or (19b)] implicitly defines the Nash tariff reaction function for A.  




12 2 2 2 2
/
(20) 0
() ( ) ( 2 ) /
BAB A
VV V V
BA A A A B
VV V V V Nash A
RRR D t




if and only if  210
AB
VV RR> . 
Similarly, we obtain B’s reaction function: 
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.   
The term involving  31
B E  in the Nash second best tariff for B has a similar interpretation to 
the case for A, which we have already explained.  The other term in the numerator 
involves  1
B
V R , which captures the effect of B’s tariff on its wage.  Notice that if B raises   11












.  In this case, the 










, the supply reduction of 
illegal labor will raise the wage in A.  In turn, given enforcement, this raises 
A
I WW z p =− .  This is a terms of trade gain for B in the factor market.  Consequently, in 
this case, B can exploit its monopolistic power (as a seller of illegal labor) by imposing a 
positive tariff on good-1.  Notice that even if  31 0
B E = , a positive tariff is optimal because 
of this reason if  1
B
V R is positive andβ  is sufficiently small such that:  0
A
VV IR β +< .  
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It is clear from (20) and (22) that the sign of the two reaction functions must be the same.  
If the signs of  2
A
V R and  1
B
V R are the same (positive or negative), the reaction functions must 
be positively sloped, otherwise they are negatively sloped.   
Relations (17), (18), (19) and (21) can be simultaneously solved to obtain the 
Nash equilibrium tariff rates for A and B, as well as the optimal enforcement levels  i e  
and  b e  for nation-A.  The Nash tariff equilibrium for negatively sloped reaction functions 
is demonstrated in figure-1.      
 
[graph 1] around here. 
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2.3.   The effect of a Preferential Trade Liberalization at the Nash Equilibrium 
In this section, we analyze how the national welfare levels of A and B are affected 
if both nations agree to reduce tariffs starting from the initial Nash tariff equilibrium.  
The literature on second best tariffs (in the absence of illegal immigration considerations) 
suggests that liberalization may or may not raise welfare in an already distorted 
economy.
4   We explore how illegal immigration affects this conclusion and identify 
conditions under which liberalization will be welfare improving.  The following 
proposition formally states our findings. 
Proposition 1.   At the Nash equilibrium, the host nation A gains from a tariff 
liberalization by the source nation B if and only if B’s wage rate is positively related to 
the price of good-1 (i.e.,  1 0
B
V R > ).  In this latter case, assuming that B’s Nash tariff on 
good-1 is positive, a sufficient condition for B to gain from A’s liberalization (of tariff on 
good-2) is that A’s wage rate is negatively related to the price of good-2 (i.e.,  2 0
A
V R < )   
Proof:  
Evaluating the derivatives at the Nash equilibrium and using A’s first order conditions for 
the choices of  2














Using the (Nash) first order condition for the choice of  2
A t ,  i e and  b e ,  (23a) can be 
reduced to: 
                                                 
4 The Kemp-Wan proposition discussed in Ethier and Horn (1984) suggests that the adjustment of the 
external tariff makes the complete elimination of internal tariff under customs unions welfare improving 
without harming the rest of the world.  Panagariya and Krishna (2002) extends this to the case of an FTA.  
Throughout the analysis we hold the external tariff constant leaving the examination of the Kemp-Wan type 
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.   
(23b) proves the first part of the proposition.  Notice that the condition requires that B’s 
wage falls as price of good-1 is reduced.  A fall in B’s wage is a terms of trade gain for A 
(the importer of labor).  Therefore, only when tariff liberalization by B reduces its wage, 
A gains from it [the other gains for A have already been internalized by the choice of its 
Nash utility maximizing combination of ( 2 ,,
A
ib te e )].  Similarly, analyzing the effect of a 
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.  This proves the second part of the proposition above.  It is 
intuitive that liberalization by A (that reduces its internal price of good-2) confers a terms 
of trade benefit to B (the exporter of labor) when the wage in A rises.  This happens when 
2 0
A
V R < .  ■ 
  
2.4.   The Effect of A’s Pre-commitment to Liberalize Tariff on Good-3: A Two-
Stage Analysis 
  The analysis above assumed that the tariffs on good-3 for the two nations are 
given exogenously.  Here we consider the situation where A may alter its tariff on good-3 
at a stage prior to the stage where the two nations choose their respective Nash   14
equilibrium tariffs (on goods 1 and 2) and the enforcement levels.  If  3
A t is chosen is 
stage-1 and the other choice variables for both nations in stage-2, then the analysis for the 
previous section is unaffected (because as far as stage-2 is concerned,  3
A t is still 
exogenous).
5  
First, we see how the reaction function of A is affected by the reduction of the 
tariff on good 3.  Second, we examine how this will affect the Nash equilibrium tariff of 
B.  Finally, we explore how this affects A’s utility .
6  From (20) and (22), the slopes of the 
reaction functions do not change in response to the change in the tariff on good on 3. 
Denoting the left hand side of (19a) as 
















The denominator of (25) must be negative from the second order condition of A’s choice 
of the Nash second best tariff.  Thus, if good 2 and 3 are substitutes (i.e.,  0 32 >
A E ), the 
reduction in 
A t3  will shift A’s reaction function down, as described in the graph 2 (which 
assumes that the reaction functions are negatively sloped).  On the other hand, if  0 32 <
A E , 
A’s reaction function shifts up. 
 
[graph 2] around here 
 
                                                 
5 For simplicity, let us assume that B’s tariff on good-3 is still exogenously given for this two stage model. 
6 Bond, Syropoulos, and Winters (2001) discuss how trade liberalization in a customs union affects the 
multilateral trading process.  They find that intra-bloc trade liberalization which requires the reduction of 
the external tariff is negatively associated with the elasticity of substitution between member and 
nonmember goods.   15
Let us consider the case where the goods are substitutes.  Given B’s reaction function, if 
A pre-commits to a lower 
A t3 , it would lead to an increase in 
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< and if 
1 0
B
V R > .  The latter was discussed in proposition-1.  This means that A has to balance the 








], with the loss that will 
occur through the strategic effect captured by the second term.  Under strategic 
substitutability (the case that obtains when  1 0
B
V R > and  2 0
A
V R < ), the reduction in 
2
A t (following the cut in  3
A t ) will raise  1
B t .  Given  1 0
B
V R > , this will raise the wage in B.  
The latter is a terms of trade loss for A and will deter A from liberalizing its tariff on 
good-3.      
Proposition 2.   Reduction of A’s tariff on good-3 leads to a higher Nash equilibrium 
tariff on good-1 by B when goods 2 and 3 are Hicksian substitutes (for A) and when the 
tariff reaction functions are downward sloping (i.e., tariffs on goods 1 and 2 are strategic   16
substitutes for each other).  The strategic effect moderates A’s potential gains from tariff 
liberalization on good-3.   
Proof:  The text preceding the proposition constitutes the proof.  ■    
 
3. Conclusion 
     The paper focuses on the interdependence of second best tariffs for potential 
members of a preferential trading bloc in the presence of illegal immigration between 
them.  We identify conditions that determine the effect of such tariff liberalization on 
illegal immigration.  We also describe the Nash equilibrium tariffs that exist in the 
absence of any agreement and use them as a benchmark to discuss potential utility gains 
from intra-bloc liberalization.  Finally, we consider how the host nation’s incentives to 
liberalize its trade with a non-member may be affected by strategic considerations that 
pertain to tariffs imposed by the source nation for illegal immigration.  ▄  
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A Φ  : A’s Reaction function 
B Φ  : B’s Reaction function 
E : Nash Equilibrium 
E’ 







A Φ  : A’s Reaction function after reduction in 
A t3  
E’ : new Nash Equilibrium   19
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Given 
A t3  and at optimal  i e  and  b e , the utility maximizing choice of 
A t2  requires: 
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Combined with (15), (A1) can be rewritten 
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.  Noting that 
AB
VV VV DR R =+, and using it in the last equality in (A2) above, we get (19a) of the text.  










.  We substitute this in (A2) and 
obtain (19b). 
 
2.  Deriving B’s Second Best Nash Tariff Reaction Function:  
Totally differentiating (2), and using (5),  β + =
B
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1 1 = = . Therefore, (A3) can be rewritten as 
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Plug this back in (A4), we solve for B’s second best tariff in (21b). 
 
3.  The effect of A’s tariff reduction on B’s utility: (Proposition 1 part a) 
Based on (A3), and given the optimal enforcement ) , ( b i e e , and 
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Evaluating at the second best 







 or (21a)], 
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u − + = β  
Using the F.O.C. of the second best 
B t1 ,   21
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31 3 11 11 1 ) (  and substitute (8), (A8) can 

















D A − + − = β 1 1
2
2

















V IR R t R β  
 




































At the second best 
A t2 , 
1
1












Meanwhile, F.O.C. for 
A t2  is: 
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